Four Carmont crash safety recommendations still open six years on

Four safety recommendations from the Carmont derailment remain open more than six years after the crash near Stonehaven killed three people, according to the latest Rail Accident Investigation Branch status summary.

The outstanding items cover control-room decisions during abnormal weather, assurance of safety-critical work, weather-related failures of earthworks and drainage, and measures to mitigate the consequences of a derailment. The Office of Rail and Road (ORR), Britain's safety regulator, is monitoring each one.

What happened at Carmont?

The 06:38 Aberdeen to Glasgow Queen Street ScotRail service struck landslide debris washed onto the track during heavy rain near Carmont, Aberdeenshire, on August 12, 2020. Driver Brett McCullough, 45, conductor Donald Dinnie, 58, and passenger Christopher Stuchbury, 62, died. Six of the nine people on board — the train carried only passengers and crew permitted under pandemic restrictions — were injured.

A fatal accident inquiry found the disaster could have been prevented by basic safety checks. Sheriff Lesley Johnston ruled Network Rail should have ensured a newly built drain was constructed to its design and that the required safety documentation was handed over. The drain, built below specification, could not cope with the rainfall and carried debris onto the line.

The FAI also recorded a missed warning: water had flowed through a gully and eroded the new drain's surface before construction finished, but no one acted. The RAIB said this was a missed opportunity to recognise how the drain's earth bank affected water flow, and that it may have contributed to the crash.

What do the open recommendations cover?

• Control-room capability. Network Rail and train operators must review whether route-control rooms can manage complex incidents such as abnormal weather and multiple infrastructure failures — covering staffing levels, technical and decision-making skills, clearly defined responsibilities, training and competence checks.
• Safety assurance. Network Rail must run a project identifying weaknesses in its management arrangements and the reasons for any failures to comply with safety requirements, producing a board-endorsed improvement programme explained to frontline staff.
• Weather-related infrastructure risk. Network Rail and the Rail Safety and Standards Board must carry out a systematic risk assessment of measures limiting the effects of failures involving earthworks, drainage and structures, leading to a time-limited plan to fix weaknesses.
• Derailment mitigation. Network Rail, the Rail Delivery Group and the Rail Safety and Standards Board must apply Carmont's lessons to train and track design, including derailment risk after small landslips or washouts, track position relative to nearby ground, and the consequences of a derailed train striking structures such as bridge parapets or tunnel entrances.

Where does each item stand?

On control rooms, the ORR said Network Rail has set out a plan involving staff training, competence frameworks and work to improve understanding of abnormal weather effects — but the regulator wants evidence the frameworks are in place and that the training system gives staff the confidence to make difficult decisions in adverse conditions.

On assurance, Network Rail has established a working group to identify which activities need checking and to develop a better assurance process, linked to the competence review.

The weather-risk assessment is underway. The ORR will consider closing the recommendation once Network Rail produces a suitable plan to address identified weaknesses.

The derailment-mitigation work is proceeding through an industry research project that models how a derailed train might move and how different measures could affect the outcome. Findings so far are cautious: some measures may be impractical to retrofit to existing trains or infrastructure, others could be effective only in particular circumstances, and some devices could worsen outcomes by deflecting a train the wrong way. The project was forecast to produce a strategy and guidance by the end of 2025; the recommendation remains open.

What do the critics say?

One union official said the outstanding work "makes you wonder if they actually care about stopping another disaster", adding: "Until every single safety recommendation is completely locked in, the victims, their families, and the travelling public are going to remain deeply suspicious."

The official also questioned accountability: "Families would be rightly asking how they can expect the exact same bosses who enabled these fatal errors to be the ones tasked with fixing them?"

A Network Rail Scotland spokesperson said the FAI report records that the vast majority of RAIB recommendations have been implemented, and that the remaining items are being actively addressed. The operator has changed how services run during extreme weather, increased investment in technologies to manage climate impacts, and established Britain's first 24/7 specialist weather team in Scotland's integrated control room.

ScotRail said it works closely with Network Rail to implement the RAIB's recommendations, "to do everything possible to reduce the risk of something like this ever happening again". The ORR's next status updates will show whether the four open items close on schedule.